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Implicit Theories, Epistemic Beliefs, and Science Motivation:  
A Person-Centered Approach 
 
 Two themes that figure prominently among both policy documents and academic 
research in science education DUHLVVXHVUHODWHGWRGHYHORSLQJVWXGHQWV¶EHOLHIVDERXWWKHLU
FRPSHWHQFHLQVFLHQFHDQGDGYDQFLQJVWXGHQWV¶EHOLHIVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH
and knowing (e.g., Britner, 2007; Cleaves, 2005; Dweck, 2007; National Academy of Sciences, 
2011; National Research Council, 2000, 2007).  This body of literature points to the fact that, for 
American schools to produce scientifically competent and literate citizens, students must develop 
certain habits of mind such as building a sense of confidence in being able to succeed in science, 
developing resilience in the face of failures, and believing that scientific knowledge can change 
over time (National Academy of Sciences, 2011).  These beliefs are especially important in 
science, where many students consider such subjects considerably more difficult than their other 
subjects (Dweck, 2007), and that science experiments are done merely to prove what people 
already know (Elder, 2002; Solomon, Duveen, & Scott, 1994).  Because beliefs oftentimes can 
predict academic outcomes just as well as factors such as previous achievement or standardized 
test scores (Bandura, 1997; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; 
Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Qian & Alverman, 1995; Robins & Pals, 2002; Schommer, 1990; 
Stipek & Gralinsky, 1996), these beliefs about science competence and the nature of scientific 
knowledge and knowing are the focus of the present study.   
Although both beliefs about competence and beliefs about the nature of scientific 
knowledge and knowing are important, in the psychological literature, these two beliefs are 
W\SLFDOO\VWXGLHGVHSDUDWHO\PRVWO\EHFDXVHRIUHVHDUFKHUV¶GHVLUHVWRNHHSWKHFRQVWUXFWV
conceptually pure (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 2002).  However, Elby (2009) argued that 
educational psychologists should be wary of eliminating conceptions of ability from the 
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definition of epistemic beliefs because doing so PD\³REVFXUHUDWKHUWKDQHOXFLGDWHWKHFRQWHQW
and cognitiYHVWUXFWXUHRIVWXGHQWV¶YLHZV´S  Schommer-Aikins (2004) also argued that 
the epistemic belief system is quite narrow in scope, and there is a need to study it embedded 
within other belief systems.  In a similar fashion, Dweck and her colleagues have long argued 
WKDW³>LPSOLFLWWKHRULHVRIDELOLW\@DQGWKHLUUHODWHGPRWLYDWLRQDOYDULDEOHVKDQJWRJHWKHULQWRD
FRKHUHQWPHDQLQJV\VWHP«0RWLYDWLRQYDULDEOHVUDWKHUWKDQZRUNLQJLQLVRODWLRQDUH
repeatHGO\VHHQWRZRUNWRJHWKHUWRFUHDWHIDYRUDEOHRUXQIDYRUDEOHRXWFRPHV´'ZHFN	
Molden, 2005).  Yet, despite this meaning systems label, and despite Schommer-$LNLQV¶VFDOOWR
investigate the ways in which epistemic beliefs are embedded within other systems, there has 
EHHQQRUHVHDUFKH[SORULQJKRZWKHVHYDULDEOHVDQGIUDPHZRUNV³KDQJWRJHWKHU´RUFRQILJXUHWR
form individual patterns within students.  There is also no research exploring how such patterns 
might be related to motivation and achievement.   
Furthermore, despite acknowledging that such variables and frameworks operate 
simultaneously within individual people, a great majority of the research has been conducted 
from a variable-centered approach (e.g., regressions, path analysis), which describes how 
variables are related to other variables, on average.  However, as Molden and Dweck (2006) 
QRWHG³E\DWWHPSWLQJWRGHVFULEHRQO\WKHDYHUDJHRQHUXQVWKHULVNRIGHVFULELQJQRERG\LQ
SDUWLFXODU´S7KLVSRLQWVXJJHVWVWKDWUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVFoncerning psychological 
phenomena often deal with a person as a unit of analysis (e.g., does facilitating a belief that 
scientific knowledge is constantly evolving relate to whether students like science more?).  
However, when researchers answer these research questions using techniques that assume that 
the sample is the unit of analysis (variable-centered techniques), the findings can be misleading 
when applied to actual classroom practice (Kaplan, Katz, & Flum, 2012; Molenaar & Campbell, 
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2009; Molenaar et al., 2011).  For this reason, by using a person-centered approach (Bergman, 
Magnusson, & El-Khouri, 2003)²one that assumes that there are many types or profiles of 
students among the larger population²both theory and practice may be advanced.   
Therefore, three main objectives guided the present study.  The first objective was to 
uncover the various student profiles that may exist among middle- and high school students 
using beliefs about the plasticity of intellectual ability and beliefs about the nature of science 
knowledge.  This objective is in line with Schommer-$LNLQV¶V (2004) proposal to investigate 
how beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing and beliefs about innate ability interact 
with each other.  It is also in keeping with the main goals of science education reform to target 
VWXGHQWV¶FRPSHWHQFHEHOLHIVDQGEHOLHIVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH(National 
Academy of Sciences, 2011; National Research Council, 2000, 2007).  Because these different 
profiles are likely related to different motivational and achievement outcomes, the second 
objective was to examine whether these student profiles are related to science achievement, the 
types of goals that students pursue, and their science self-efficacy.  Finally, because beliefs about 
the nature of knowledge and knowing, as well as conceptions of ability have been shown to 
differ as a function of demographic variables (Dweck, 1999; 2007; see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 
2002), the third objective was to explore whether the student profiles differed as a function of 
race/ethnicity, gender, and grade level.  
Theoretical Framework 
Implicit Theories of Ability 
 According to Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, and Wan (1999), implicit theories of ability create 
a meaning system in which ability and effort are given disproportionate weighting²students 
with an incremental view of ability are apt to place more import on effort, whereas those with a 
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fixed view of ability tend to place more weight on ability.  Although both an incremental and a 
fixed theory of ability may orient students to view both hard work and innate ability as necessary 
for successful performance, students with an incremental view of ability are likely to view effort 
as the more important cause of their performance outcome (Dweck, 1999; Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995).  In contrast, students with a fixed view of ability are likely to view innate ability as 
the more important cause. 
Implicit theories can also be domain specific.  Thus, some students may believe that their 
science abilities are a relatively stable entity while simultaneously believing that their abilities in 
social studies are increasable (Stipek & Gralinsky, 1996).  As Bandura (1997) observed, 
³Fonceptions of ability should not be viewed as monolithic traits that govern the whole of life.  
The same person may view ability differently in different domains RIIXQFWLRQLQJ´S
Although much research has investigated how implicit theories of ability operate within math 
classes, far less research has explored the construct within science classes.  Yet, the implicit 
theory construct, along with all of its associated constructs, is likely useful for helping 
researchers and educators to better understand science motivation.  As mentioned earlier, science 
is often construed as being more difficult than other subjects (see Dweck, 2007), and when 
students lose the desire to pursue science-related subjects, they often blame their lack of science 
ability as a main reason for leaving the field (National Academies of Science, 2011).  Therefore, 
DOWKRXJKWKHWKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNXQGHUJLUGLQJVWXGHQWV¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIDELOLW\LVWKHVDPH
regardless of the academic context, these beliefs are perhaps more salient in science, as Dweck 
(KDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHHIIHFWVRIVWXGHQWV¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIDELOLW\GRQRWEHFRPHHYLGHQWXQWLO
students begin to struggle and run into obstacles.   
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 Implicit theories can also be primed or induced (see Dweck and Molden, 2005).  
Therefore, although these beliefs typically do not change researchers have reported success in 
teaching students either a fixed or an incremental theory of ability in intervention studies (e.g., 
Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007).  When these 
conceptions of ability have been taught to students, results have indicated that the two belief 
systems lead to two different motivational and achievement outcomes (see Dweck & Master, 
2009 for a review).  %HFDXVHVWXGHQWV¶LPSOLFLWWKHRULHVRIDELOLW\DUHIDirly easily primed, some 
have argued that the implicit theory construct is likely a knowledge structure such that both the 
fixed and the incremental views are freely available to students at all times, but that people may 
prefer one belief over the other in particular contexts (see Anderson, 1995).   
 Finally, Dweck (1999, 2002) has argued that conceptions of ability develop at a very 
\RXQJDJH<RXQJFKLOGUHQILUVWEHFRPHIDPLOLDUZLWKLVVXHVRI³JRRGQHVV´DQG³EDGQHVV´
which they may believe to be stable or malleable.  As they get older and begin school, students 
develop an awareness that ability might be a quality about themselves (see Butler, 1998; Marsh, 
Craven, & Debus, 1991; Stipek & Daniels, 1988), and by around age 7-8 are interested in 
comparing their abilities and performance with others.  By age 10-12, these beliefs about ability 
begin to form networks, or meaning systems, with other beliefs such as the value of effort as well 
as interest in particular subjects (see Butler, 1990, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Stipek & 
Gralinski, 1991; Wigfield et al., 1997).  Because this meaning system, with conceptions of 
ability at its root, only begins taking hold during early adolescence, it is not until students reach 
this age (e.g., 10-12 years old) that these beliefs about ability begin to predict academic 
outcomes.   
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*RDORULHQWDWLRQVLQ'ZHFN¶VIUDPHZRUN.  Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 1988) hypothesized that the differential patterns of behavior 
formed by the two conceptions of ability (i.e., fixed versus incremental) may be linked to the 
goals that students pursue while engaging in problem-solving activities.  Dweck and her 
colleagues have found that students who believed that their abilities could be augmented tended 
to display mastery orientated behaviors such as pursuing tasks for the sake of learning.  On the 
other hand, students who espoused the view that their abilities were static tended to display 
performance oriented behaviors such as either showing off how smart they are or choosing not to 
do a task altogether to avoid looking incompetent (Blackwell et al., 2007; Dweck & Sorich, 
1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Robins & Pals, 2002).   
 Self-efficacy in 'ZHFN¶VIUDPHZRUN.  A number of studies have suggested that, during 
an intervention, when students are primed to espouse an incremental view of ability, their 
confidence to perform a task does not diminish in the face of challenges (Jourden, Bandura, 
&Banfield, 1991; Tabernero & Wood, 1999).  Because the above studies were experimental, and 
conducted in laboratory settings, Bråten and Olaussen (1998) explored these relationships in a 
more naturalistic setting.  They found that an incremental view of ability significantly predicted 
strategy use, independent of self-efficacy, which Dweck (2002) cited as evidence that 
conceptions of ability may have a stronger impact on academic outcomes than do self-efficacy.   
 However, as Bandura (1997) has argued, conceptions of ability exert their effects not on 
achievement and behavior, but rather on the self-regulatory mechanisms that lead to 
DFKLHYHPHQW,QSDUWLFXODU³YLHZLQJDELOLW\DVDQLQKHUHQWFDSDFLW\ORZHUVSHUFHLved self-
efficacy, retards skill development, and diminishes interest in the activity.  Although belief in the 
acquirability of talent is conducive to high personal development, it does not necessarily ensure 
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LW´%DQGXUDS7KDWLVa fixed view of ability leads to low self-efficacy, whereas 
an incremental view of ability is an important but insufficient component of robust high 
achievement.  Sustained high achievement, according to Bandura, requires not only the belief 
WKDWRQH¶VFDSDFLW\Fan be expanded, but also the belief that one can muster all the resources in 
WKDWSHUVRQ¶VUHSHUWRLUHRINQRZOHGJHDQGVNLOOVWRDFKLHYHDSDUWLFXODURXWFRPHLHWKHVHOI-
efficacy to achieve at a high level over an extended period of time).   
Epistemic Beliefs 
Defining epistemic beliefs.  In addition to implicit theories of ability, some researchers 
(e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002; Schommer, 1990) have argued that the beliefs that students 
hold about the nature of knowledge and knowing²epistemic beliefs²might also play a role in 
VKDSLQJVWXGHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQEpistemic beliefs have received considerable attention in the past 
decade and describe people¶s beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing.  Although 
individuals unconsciously hold these beliefs about knowledge and knowing, they are still 
influenced by them.  For example, although a professor may frown upon students using the 
popular online reference Wikipedia as a source to justify a knowledge claim, students may see 
this source as a legitimate authority.  Therefore, different people hold different beliefs about how 
knowledge can be justified, and as a result make different judgments about the credibility of 
particular sources.  As informed consumers, people make judgments about how good a particular 
product is by reading reviews from Consumer Reports or from online magazines, thereby placing 
an amount of trust in the certainty of knowledge claims published in these journals.  As learners 
in a classroom, students approach learning tasks in different ways depending on whether they see 
the material they are learning in their science classes, for example, as being connected to or 
isolated from what they learn in their other classes.   
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Models of epistemic beliefs.  Contemporary models of epistemic beliefs fall generally 
into one of two types: (1) unidimensional developmental models, and (2) models that consist of 
PXOWLSOHVRPHZKDWLQGHSHQGHQWO\RSHUDWLQJGLPHQVLRQV%\³LQGHSHQGHQWO\RSHUDWLQJ´
scholars typically imply that individuals can simultaneously possess varying levels of each of the 
multiple dimensions.  For example, students may espouse the belief that scientific knowledge 
FDQRQO\FRPHIURPDNQRZOHGJHDEOHHOLWHLH³UHDOVFLHQWLVWV´EXWDOVRVLPXOWDQHRXVO\
EHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHFDQEHPXOWLSOH³ULJKWDQVZHUV´WRDTXHVWLRQLQVFLHQFHDevelopmental 
PRGHOVVXFKDV3HUU\¶V(1970) PRGHORU.XKQ¶VPRGHORIDUJXPHQWDWLYHUHDVRQLQJ
characterize people by placing them on a continuum of beliefs that begins at more simplistic 
YLHZVHJ³GXDOLVP´LQ3HUU\¶VPRGHORU³absolutism´LQ.XKQ¶VPRGHOWRPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHG
YLHZVHJ³UHODWLYLVP´LQ3HUU\¶VPRGHORU³evaluativism´LQ.XKQ¶VPRGHO 
Concerning domain-specificity, models that take more of a developmental perspective 
assume that beliefs about knowledge and knowing are domain general.  This becomes apparent 
when one considers the questions that these researchers ask their participants.  Rather than 
asking participants questions that require some content-specific knowledge, participants are 
DVNHGYHU\EURDGDQGJHQHUDOTXHVWLRQV6FKRPPHU¶VPRGHORIHSLVWHPRORJLFDOEHOLHIVDOVR
initially presumed that these beliefs were domain general.  However, this assumption has been 
called into question, especially with research showing that problem-solving and critical thinking 
are primarily domain specific (e.g., Chi, Glazer, & Farr, 1988).  The consensus within the field is 
that epistemic beliefs, although having some aspects of domain generality, are also domain-
specific (for reviews see Hofer, 2006; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006).  Following the 
recommendations of Hofer (2006) and Muis et al. (2006), the present study employed a measure 
specific to science. 
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 Measures of epistemic beliefs vary somewhat in their definitions and in the number of 
dimensions that are included.  Although Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proposed that epistemic 
beliefs should be thought of in terms of the four core dimensions (simplicity, certainty, source, 
and justification of knowledge), others have used quantitative measures that include anywhere 
from three dimensions (Qian & Alvermann, 1995) to five (Wood & Kardash, 2002).  As 
mentioned earlier, some of these dimensions assess constructs like beliefs about learning, 
teaching, or ability, which are not central to beliefs about knowledge and knowing.  For this 
reason, findings concerning the relationships between epistemic beliefs and academic motivation 
vary depending on the instrument used to assess epistemic beliefs.  In the present study, I 
followed the guidelines set forth by Hofer and Pintrich by assessing only the four core 
components of epistemic beliefs, thereby treating beliefs about knowledge and knowing as a 
separate construct from conceptions of ability.   
 Relationship between implicit theories of ability and epistemic beliefs: The 
Embedded Systemic Model.  Researchers have begun to investigate the relationship between 
epistemic beliefs and implicit theories of ability (Bråten & Strømsø, 2004; Chen & Pajares, 
2010; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1990; Schommer, Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992).  For 
example, Bråten & Strømsø, (2004) sought to discover the differential contribution of epistemic 
beliefs and implicit theories to the adoption of achievement goal orientations.  Their results 
indicated that one dimension of 6FKRPPHU¶V measure of epistemic beliefs ³TXLFN
OHDUQLQJ´ was a significant predictor of goal orientations, whereas implicit theories of ability 
were less predictive of goal orientations.  However, WKH³TXLFNOHDUQLQJ´GLPHQVLRQLVQRW
traditionally considered a core dimension of epistemic beliefs.  Rather, it is often thought of as 
more in line with conceptions of ability (see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).   Furthermore, Bråten & 
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Strømsø found no significant correlations between the core components of epistemic beliefs 
(simplicity and certainty of knowledge, which are in fact epistemic) and goal orientations.  This 
raises the question of whether the core components of epistemic beliefs really are more important 
predictors of achievement goal orientations as compared to implicit theories of ability.  Clearly, 
more empirical evidence is needed to clarify the contribution of implicit theories of ability and 
the four core components of epistemic beliefs to the adoption of achievement goal orientations.  
Specifically, more research needs to be conducted whereby beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing are kept separate from constructs dealing with the nature of learning 
and ability, as outlined by Hofer and Pintrich.   
On the other hand, even though beliefs about ability and beliefs about knowledge are 
separate constructs, these beliefs are likely related to one another.  ,Q6FKRPPHU¶V
original model, she proposed that beliefs about innate ability were part of the same construct as 
beliefs about knowledge and knowing.  However, after much debate, she significantly refined the 
model, which she called the Embedded Systemic Model (Schommer-Aikins, 2004).  In this 
model, Schommer-Aikins broke from her original conception that beliefs about ability should be 
considered one dimension of epistemic beliefs, and instead recognized them as two different 
constructs.  This separation allows researchers to model the interrelationships between these two 
beliefs.  Using this Embedded Systemic Model, she presented a scenario positing that students 
who believe that knowledge can only come from a knowledgeable elite are more likely to view 
learning as passive, to believe that intellectual ability is fixed, and are less likely to question 
authorities in a classroom.  This illustration suggests that beliefs about science knowledge and 
NQRZLQJ³KDQJWRJHWKHU´ZLWKFRQFHSWLRQVRIDELOLW\LQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWDweck and Molden 
(2005) described how YDULDEOHVLQ'ZHFN¶VVRFLDO-cognitive framework hang together.   
 11 
There are also theoretical reasons for why epistemic beliefs and implicit theories are 
linked together.  Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) observed that philosophers like Alfred North 
Whitehead posited two different worldviews that individuals embraced²one that viewed the 
world as a static world of unchanging objects and the other that viewed the world as a complex 
and dynamic system of interrelated processes (p. 282).  The dimensions of epistemic beliefs 
include this idea of a static versus a dynamic view of scientific knowledge.  Conceptions of 
ability, of course, also feature this concept of fixedness versus dynamism.  Moreover, Hofer and 
Pintrich (1997) hypothesized that epistemic beliefs might function as a kind of implicit theory, 
which would give rise to particular achievement goal orientations, much in the same way that 
'ZHFN¶VLPplicit theory construct does.  Therefore, given the considerable overlap between 
these two belief systems, found in both the empirical literature as well as theoretical works, it is 
possible that epistemic beliefs may be linked with the same meaning system that weaves the 
implicit theory construct together with motivation and other aspects of cognition.   
Finally, modeling these two beliefs together to show their relationships to science 
achievement and motivation not only makes theoretical sense, but it also makes practical sense.  
As mentioned earlier, two main goals of science education reform include targeting stXGHQWV¶
beliefs that they possess the abilities to do well in science, as well as the belief that scientific 
knowledge is complex, continually revised, and must be supported using multiple lines of 
empirical evidence.  Therefore, by keeping beliefs about knowledge and knowing separate from 
beliefs about innate ability, the present study is in keeping with calls from educational 
psychologists to keep the two constructs conceptually pure.  Moreover, in keeping with calls 
from the science education community, the present study models how beliefs about the nature of 
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science and beliefs about science ability relate with each other and with science achievement and 
motivation.   
Group Differences in Implicit Theories of Ability and Epistemic Beliefs 
Some researcherVKDYHEHJXQWRXQFRYHUGLIIHUHQFHVLQVWXGHQWV¶LPSOLFLWWKHRULHVE\
gender and race/ethnicity.  Dweck and her colleagues have suggested that girls, especially high-
achieving girls, tend to endorse more of a fixed view of ability than their male counterparts, 
especially in science  (Dweck, 1986, 2007). Chen and Pajares (2010) also found that, when 
controlling for previous achievement, boys were more likely to endorse an incremental view of 
ability than were girls in a sample of Grade 6 science students.  Why might there be this gender 
difference in conceptions of ability?  For one, girls who have had a history of outstanding 
performance generally possess lower expectancies for success do not prefer novel or difficult 
tasks, and display maladaptive beliefs and behavior patterns such as giving up prematurely, 
attributing failures to lack of ability rather than a lack of appropriate strategies (Licht & Dweck, 
1984; Parsons, Meece, Adler, & Kaczala, 1982; Stipek & Hoffman, 1980).  Also, according to 
Dweck (1986, 2007), as students progress from one science class to the next, not only do 
students have to learn new skills in order to succeed, but they also have to accept and learn new 
conceptual frameworks.  For example, learning chemistry requires understanding quite a 
different conceptual framework than does learning biology or Earth and Space science.  Given 
JLUOV¶ORZHUSURFOLYLW\HVSHFLDOO\KLJK-achieving girls) to enjoy novel and challenging tasks, 
compared to boys, there may certainly be gender differences in science subjects with regard to 
conceptions of ability.   
As for differences as a function of race/ethnicity, the research literature concerning 
implicit theories of ability is thin.  However, there are empirical and theoretical reasons for why 
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differences might emerge.  For example, Good, Aronson, and Inzlicht (2003) showed that an 
LQWHUYHQWLRQGHVLJQHGWRPDQLSXODWHVWXGHQWV¶LPSOLFLWWKHRULHVRIDELOLW\ within a computer skills 
class displayed differential effects depending on race/ethnicity.  Specifically, Black students 
responded more positively to the incremental theory of ability treatment than did their White 
peers.  Dweck and her colleagues have shown that a greater proportion of Asian students tend to 
fall into the incremental view of ability than do their Western counterparts (Chiu, Hong, & 
Dweck, 1997; Kim, Grant, & Dweck, 2000).  They also found that Asian students who hold an 
incremental theory of ability tended to pursue tasks for the sake of appearing competent or shied 
away from tasks to avoid embarrassment (i.e., held performance goal orientations).  This is in 
contrast to Western students who tended to hold learning goal orientations if they espoused an 
incremental theory of ability.  These results suggesting that there are differences based on 
race/ethnicity are in contrast to others, however, who have found no differences in implicit 
theories of ability as a function of race/ethnicity (e.g., Chen & Pajares, 2010).   
Beyond empirical reasons for finding racial/ethnic differences in conceptions of ability, 
theoretical reasons exist too.  First, Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989) suggested that different 
implicit theories may be emphasized by cultural factors.  For example, Asian cultures, compared 
to Western cultures, have been hypothesized to emphasize a lack of effort and strategy-use when 
explaining failure (Chen, 2001; Hess, Chang, & McDevitt, 1987; Holloway, Kashiwagi, Hess, & 
Azuma, 1986).  Because these attributions to either effort or ability are the very basis for 
VWXGHQWV¶LPplicit theories of ability, this belief might differ as a function of race/ethnicity.  Also, 
as Sternberg and Grigorenko (2004) argued, culture shapes how one defines ability.  Therefore, 
VWXGHQWV¶FRQFHSWLRQVRIDELOLW\GRQRWGHYHORSLQDYDFXXPEXWUDWKHUDre intertwined with the 
 14 
beliefs of the people within their cultural contexts (Ames & Archer, 1987; Bempechat, Graham, 
& Jimenez, 1999; Quihuis, Bempechat, Jimenez, & Boulay, 2002).   
Much research has been conducted examining gender differences in epistemic beliefs 
(e.g., Baxter Magolda, 1992; Belenky et al., 1986; Chen & Pajares, 2010; Clinchy et al., 1985).  
These studies have shown mixed results²some finding gender differences and others showing 
none.  These discrepancies might have arisen from methodological and assessment differences.  
For example, Pintrich (2002) argued that the results using developmental models are usually 
qualitative, whereas the ones that treat epistemic beliefs as multidimensional examine the 
construct quantitatively using surveys.  Not surprisingly, the qualitative studies find group-level 
differences whereas the quantitative ones usually do not.  From a theoretical point of view, 
Pintrich (2002) proposed that gender or group-level differences in epistemic beliefs are likely not 
to arise because variables like gender and race/ethnicity serve only as proxies for more important 
factors.  Pintrich proffered the example of gender orientation²the stereotypic beliefs about 
gender that students hold²as a better explanatory variable than gender (see Brosnan, 1998; 
Harter, Waters, & Whitesell, 1997).  Ultimately, Pintrich argued that there might be factors 
underlying surface-level characteristics like sex or ethnicity that explain group differences.  This 
line of inquiry, however, has largely gone unexamined.   
Despite 3LQWULFK¶V proposal, Pintrich also conceded that such a proposition is 
highly contentious and was meant to spur further research on the topic.  He also conceded that 
those who argue against his proposition do so on the grounds that explaining away differences in 
epistemic beliefs based on an underlying psychological factor might not be possible, given how 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶JHQGHUDQGUDFHHWKQLFLW\PD\QRWEHGLVHQWDQJOHGIURPWKHLUEHOLHIVDQGWKHZD\VLQ
which they think.  This line of reasoning and its associated research (e.g., Karabenick & Moosa, 
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2005) suggest, as many have argued, that the individual cannot be separated from the cultural 
context (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Quihuis et al., 2002; Vygotsky, 1978).   
Finally, it is possible that there are developmental issues related to how implicit theories 
of ability and epistemic beliefs are related to motivation and achievement.  Dweck and Leggett 
(1988) argued that implicit theories of ability can develop quite early.  However, implicit 
theories alone do not have a primary effect on achievement and behavior.  It is only when 
implicit theories become linked with a host of other beliefs such as goal orientations, beliefs 
about effort or failure, and perhaps beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing that they 
begin to exert their influence on academic outcomes (Dweck, 2002).  According to Dweck, these 
beliefs do not form a coherent network until early adolescence.  Therefore, it is possible that 
students in early middle school (like the youngest students in the present study) may differ from 
high school students in how strongly their conceptions of science ability are related to other 
motivation variables and beliefs about the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing.   
Epistemic beliefs also may undergo developmental changes.  Students are more likely to 
hold more sophisticated beliefs about knowledge and knowing as they get older and progress 
through more schooling (see Hofer & Pinrich, 1997 for a review).  However, Hofer and Pintrich 
also suggested that there may be a recursive effect whereby epistemic beliefs, after progressing 
in a more sophisticated direction, may revert back to less sophisticated stances during times of 
important transitions.  Therefore, Grade 9 students, who are experiencing high school for the first 
time, may revert back to less sophisticated positions of epistemic beliefs that are more closely 
aligned with students in middle school. This notion has yet to be tested, however.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
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 With the above theoretical framework in mind, the purpose of the present study was to 
explore the individual belief profiles that naturally arise among middle school and high school 
science students.  The relationships between these belief profiles to science achievement and 
other prominent motivation variables were also examined. The second purpose was to explore 
the demographic and developmental differences among the different belief profiles.  The 
following research questions and hypotheses guided the present study: 
1) What distinct student profiles emerge from measures of science epistemic beliefs and implicit 
theories of science ability?  Based on previous cluster-analytic research using epistemic 
beliefs (Buehl & Alexander, 2005), subgroups consisting of strongly adaptive and strongly 
maladaptive epistemic beliefs and implicit theories of ability were hypothesized to emerge.  
A number of subgroups consisting of mixed configurations of adaptive and maladaptive 
beliefs were also hypothesized to emerge.  
2) How do these emergent student profiles relate to science achievement and other relevant 
motivation variables: Achievement goal orientations, self-efficacy, and achievement?  Based 
on previous cluster-analytic research (Bråten & Olaussen, 2005; Buehl & Alexander, 2005), 
adaptive profiles (e.g., clusters that include such beliefs as incremental theory of ability and 
the belief that knowledge is constantly evolving rather than static) were hypothesized to be 
related to mastery goal orientations, higher self-efficacy, and science achievement.  Student 
profiles that are less adaptive (e.g., clusters that include such beliefs as a fixed theory of 
ability and the belief that scientific experiments are simply projects people do in class rather 
than tools used to test hypotheses) were hypothesized to be related to performance goal 
orientations and lower self-efficacy and science achievement.  
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3) How do these emergent student profiles differ by race/ethnicity, gender, and grade level?  
Based on the above review of literature on differences as a function of demographic 
variables, the researcher hypothesized that no differences would be found as a function of 
race/ethnicity and gender.  With regards grade level, older students should have a greater 
probability of being in profiles with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs. 
Methodology 
Participants and Setting   
 Participants were middle and high school science students (n=1225) from 2 public high 
schools and 1 public middle school in the same county of the Southeastern United States.  The 
racial/ethnic demographics of the schools were as follows: 53% White, 20% Asian/Pacific 
Islander, 17% Black, and 8% Hispanic.  Nine percent of the students were enrolled in Special 
Education, 3% were enrolled in their sFKRRO¶V(QJOLVKDVD6HFRQG/DQJXDJH(62/SURJUDP
and 20% qualified for free or reduced price lunch.  
 Grade 6 students were enrolled in a class called Earth and Space Science, where they 
studied topics such as astronomy, the water cycle, and geology.  Grade 9 students were enrolled 
in biology, where they learned topics such as genetics, cell biology, and natural selection.  Grade 
10 students were enrolled in chemistry, where they studied topics such as gas laws, chemical 
equations, and periodicity of the elements.  
Measures 
 The variables in the present study have been used by researchers in investigations of 
science (e.g., Britner & Pajares, 2001; Conley et al., 2004; Dweck, 1999; Elder, 2002; 
Zimmerman & Bandura, 1994).  All motivation variables in the present study were assessed 
using a 6-point Likert scale.  For science self-efficacy, a rating of (1) represents a response of not 
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at all confident and a rating of (6) represented a response of completely confident.  For all other 
variables, a rating of (1) represents a response of complete disagreement and a (6) represents a 
response of complete agreement. Scores for each variable were calculated by obtaining a mean 
value. For academic achievement, midterm and end-of-term grades were collected in numerical 
form as the teachers marked them in their grade books. Grades range from 0-100.  
 Implicit theories of science ability.  Items for the Implicit Theories of Science Ability 
scale were adapted from those used by Dweck (1999), and consist of six items that ask students 
specifically about their abilities in science rather than just their general intellectual abilities, as is 
WKHFDVHZLWKWKHRULJLQDOVXUYH\7KH³VHOI´IRUPIRUFKLOGUHQ\HDUVDQGROGHU'ZHFN
was used and worded to ensure that students focused on their ideas about their own science 
DELOLW\UDWKHUWKDQRQWKHLULGHDVDERXWSHRSOHLQJHQHUDO7KUHHLWHPVĮ DVVHVVHGVWXGHQWV¶
IL[HGWKHRU\RIVFLHQFHDELOLW\HJ³<RXKDYHDFHUWDLQDPRXQWRIVFLHQFHDELOLW\DQG\RXUHDOO\
caQ¶WGRPXFKWRFKDQJHLW´DQGWKUHHRWKHUVĮ DVVHVVHGWKHLULQFUHPHQWDOWKHRU\HJ³No 
matter who you are, you can change your science abilities a lot´ 
Epistemic beliefs about the nature of science.  Epistemic beliefs were assessed along 
the four core dimensions of the construct with a 26-item instrument created and used by Conley 
et al. (2004).  All questions were worded so that students focused specifically on the domain of 
science.  The four core dimensions that were assessed are as follows: Source (5 items) is 
FRQFHUQHGZLWKEHOLHIVDERXWNQRZOHGJHUHVLGLQJLQH[WHUQDODXWKRULWLHVHJ³:KDWHYHUWKH
WHDFKHUVD\VLQVFLHQFHFODVVLVWUXH´&HUWDLQW\LWHPVUHSUHVHQWVWKHEHOLHIWKDWTXHVWLRQVin 
VFLHQFHKDYHRQHFRUUHFWDQVZHUHJ³$OOTXHVWLRQVLQVFLHQFHKDYHRQHULJKWDQVZHU´1RWH
that the source and certainty dimensions are stated from a naïve perspective.  Development (6 
items) is concerned with beliefs about science as an evolving and constantly changing body of 
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NQRZOHGJHHJ³6RPHWLPHVVFLHQWLVWVFKDQJHWKHLUPLQGVDERXWZKDWLVWUXHLQVFLHQFH´
Justification (9 items) is concerned with how students justify scientific claims, specifically as it 
relates to the role of scientifiFH[SHULPHQWVHJ³*RRGDQVZHUVDUHEDVHGRQHYLGHQFHIURP
many different experiments´). Note that the development and justification dimensions are stated 
from a sophisticated perspective.   
Conley et al. (2004) used this scale, which was adapted from EOGHU¶VRULJLQDO
work, to assess students attending five elementary schools in the Southwest and reported the 
following coefficient alphas for the four dimensions, each one measured at two time points: 
Source (alphas were .81 (t1) and .82 (t2)); Certainty (alphas = .78 and .79); Development (alphas 
were .57 and .66); and Justification (alphas were .65 and .76).  Mason, Gava, and Boldrin (2008) 
used the Certainty and Development sections of the questionnaire and obtained an overall 
UHOLDELOLW\RIĮ 73. In her original scale, Elder obtained coefficient alphas for the following 
three dimensions: Development (.67); Justification (.52); and Source (.64).  A low coefficient 
DOSKDZDVREWDLQHGLQ(OGHU¶VRULJLQDOVFDOHIRUWKH&HUWDLQW\GLPHQVLRQĮ.  For the 
present study, I obtained coefficients alpha of .78 for the Development dimension, .86 for the 
Justification dimension, .74 for the Source dimension, and .73 for the Certainty dimension.   
 Science grade self-efficacy.  6WXGHQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQRbtaining either an A, B, C, or D in 
their science class was assessed using a 4-LWHPLQVWUXPHQWHJ³+RZFRQILGHQWDUH\RXWKDW\RX
FDQJHWDJUDGHRI³&´RUEHWWHULQVFLHQFHWKLVVHPHVWHU"´6WXGHQWVSURYLGHGDUDWLQJIRUHDFK
of the four grades mentioned above.  When researchers have used this scale in the past they have 
obtained coefficient alphas ranging from .85 to .91 (e.g., Britner & Pajares, 2001, 2006, 2009; 
Pajares, Britner, & Valiante, 2000; Usher & Pajares, 2008).  A coefficient alpha of .85 was 
obtained in the present study.   
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  Science achievement goal orientations.  Science achievement goal orientations were 
assessed using a scale derived from the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Survey (PALS) 
(Middleton & Midgley, 1997; Midgley et al., 2000) and adapted to reflect goals toward success 
LQVFLHQFHFODVV0DVWHU\JRDORULHQWDWLRQVILYHLWHPVĮ UHIOHFWVWULYLQJWRGHYHORSRQH¶V
VNLOOVDQGDELOLWLHVRUDGYDQFHRQH¶VOHDUQLQJDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHPDWHULDOHJ³,OLNH
science assignmHQWV,FDQOHDUQIURPHYHQLI,PDNHDORWRIPLVWDNHV´3HUIRUPDQFHDSSURDFK
goal orientations (5 items; Į HQWDLOIRFXVLQJRQDWWDLQLQJQRUPDWLYHFRPSHWHQFHHJ³,
ZDQWWRGREHWWHUWKDQRWKHUVWXGHQWVLQP\VFLHQFHFODVV´3HUIRUPDQFHDYRLGgoal orientations 
LWHPVĮ HQWDLOIRFXVLQJRQDYRLGLQJQRUPDWLYHFRPSHWHQFHHJ³,W¶VLPSRUWDQWWRPH
WKDW,GRQ¶WORRNVWXSLGLQVFLHQFHFODVV´  
 Demographics and achievement.  Students self-reported their grade level, age, gender, 
and race/ethnicity.  Achievement data, in the form of science grades were obtained from 
VWXGHQWV¶VFKRROUHFRUGV  
Analysis 
 For the first research question, exploring patterns of beliefs among students in science 
classes was the main concern.  For this reason, a method of analysis that forms homogenous 
groups of students was employed.  Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) is a latent variable mixture 
modeling technique used to identify groups of individuals that have similar values on the 
clustering variables, also called latent class indicators.  In the present study, six latent class 
indicators were used: fixed theory of ability, incremental theory of ability, and the four 
dimensions of epistemic beliefs (Source, Justification, Certainty, and Development).   
 In uncovering the number of latent classes or profiles that emerge from the data, models 
with 2 through 7 latent classes (k = 2 to 7) were tested.  For all models, variances were allowed 
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to differ across each of the latent class indicators within a cluster, but were constrained to be 
equal across clusters.  Additionally, all covariances were constrained to zero.  Mplus (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2010) was instructed to use 1000 random sets of starting values.  After 20 iterations, the 
100 best sets of starting values that were identified by the highest likelihood values were then 
selected for final optimization.   
 Question 2 examined how the emergent profiles relate to self-efficacy, achievement goal 
orientations, and science grade.  Mplus 6 offers a function called AUXILIARY (e), which tests 
for the equality of means using variables that were not used in forming the profiles.  This 
procedure employs a Wald chi-square test statistic to examine whether there is a statistically 
significant difference in means across profiles. Whereas in cluster analysis students are placed in 
discrete clusters or profiles, LPA builds in the fact that each individual has a probability 
associated with being in one profile.  This takes into consideration the uncertainty of whether 
someone belongs in one group as opposed to another.  These uncertainties are outputted by 
Mplus as posterior probabilities, which are then used in calculating the Wald chi-square statistic 
for equality of means.   
 Finally, to explore how the emergent student profiles differ by race/ethnicity, gender, and 
grade level, these variables were tested to examine whether they should be included in the model 
DVDFRYDULDWHWKDWSUHGLFWHGODWHQWFODVVPHPEHUVKLS7RGRWKLV0SOXV¶V$8;,/,$5<U
function was employed, which uses variables that were not used in forming the profiles to 
identify covariates that might be important predictors of the latent classes.  This is done by using 
pseudo-class draws, which are the posterior-probability based multinomial logistic regressions of 
a categorical latent variable (latent class) on a set of covariates.  After determining which of the 
above factors were significant predictors of latent class membership, the variables that 
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significantly predicted membership into the model were included by regressing the categorical 
latent variable (latent class) onto the covariate(s).  For race/ethnicity, because students could 
choose from among four categories (Asian, African American, Hispanic, and White), a variable 
called minority status was created such that students who indicated that they are Asian or White 
were classified as non-minority.  Those who indicated that they are Hispanic or Black were 
classified as minority.  This decision was made because Hispanic and Black students are 
typically underrepresented in scientific fields, whereas Asian and White students are not.   
 After determining which of the above factors were significant predictors of latent class 
membership, variables that significantly predicted membership into a latent class were included 
by regressing the categorical latent variable (latent class) on the covariates.  Marsh et al. (2009) 
suggested that correlates should not be included in the model if they influence the definition of 
the latent groups.  In addition, they strongly recommended that covariates be included in a model 
only if there is sufficient evidence to assume that the covariates are antecedent variables.  For the 
present study, gender, race/ethnicity, and grade level were assumed to influence the way in 
which students are categorized into each profile.  As has been shown previously, demographic 
variables such as race/ethnicity, gender, and age (grade level, in this case) are appropriate to 
include as covariates (Muthén, 2006). 
Results 
 Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for all variables are presented in 
Table 1.  Consistent with recommended practices among LPA researchers (Lubke & Muthén, 
2005; Pastor et al., 2007) solutions with varying numbers of latent classes were tested and 
theory, past empirical evidence, characteristics of each profile (e.g., size), and interpretability 
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were considered in arriving at a final solution.  Table 2 displays the fit statistics for all models 
tested that aided in selecting the final model.  
 A 4-class model was chosen.  Even though the 3-class model produced a non-significant 
result, suggesting a 2-class model, the 4-class model produced a number of interesting 
comparisons between profiles, as discussed later.  Furthermore, the scree plot produced a 
noticeable elbow at the 4-class solution, suggesting that the BIC did not significantly improve 
from the 4-class model to the 5-class model, which was also confirmed by the LMR.   
 Because issues about the reliability of profiles are an important concern, the entire sample 
of middle and high school students was split in three different ways: 1) by random split-halves, 
2) by grade level, and 3) by each individual school.  When compared to the full 1225-student 
sample, similar patterns were uncovered, thus providing evidence for the reliability of the 
groups.  Therefore, considering the fit indexes, interpretability, and theory as guides, a 4-class 
model was chosen.  As illustrated next, the profiles were differentiated by motivation, affect, and 
achievement in science, lending evidence for the validity of these profiles.   
Describing the Profiles 
 The first aim of the present study was to identify profiles of implicit theories of ability 
and the four dimensions of epistemic beliefs, and to explore how these profiles related to science 
motivation and achievement.  Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables 
used in forming the clusters.  Figure 1 illustrates the four latent profiles, which are labeled 
according to the interpretations of findings.  Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between these 
profiles to achievement goal orientations, self-efficacy and science grade.   
 The Thriving profile.  At 576 students (47.0%), this group represented the largest profile 
in the sample.  These students reported very low agreement with a fixed theory of ability 
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(M=2.07) and very high agreement with an incremental theory of ability (M=5.24).  These 
Thriving students strongly rejected the notion that scientific knowledge resides only in external 
authorities like science teachers or professional scientists (considered a sophisticated belief).  
They also rejected the notion that problems in science only have one correct answer (considered 
a sophisticated belief).  Thriving students also strongly believed that scientific knowledge is 
constantly evolving, and that experiments are used to support and evaluate scientific claims (both 
are considered sophisticated beliefs).  More than any other group, Thriving students reported that 
they did science-related work for the sake of learning (mastery goal orientation; M=4.46), and 
were more confident in their capability to do well in science class (self-efficacy; M=5.21).  At 
the end of the term, they earned higher science grades than their peers in any other group 
(M=86.5).   
 The Fixed/Sophisticated profile.  Similar to their Thriving peers, the 
Fixed/Sophisticated profile (n=194; 15.8%) reported what would be considered sophisticated 
stances about the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing.  However, unlike their peers in 
the Thriving group, Fixed/Sophisticated students believed more strongly in the fixed nature of 
their science abilities.  At the end of the term, these students earned fairly good grades (M=83.5), 
though slightly lower than their peers in the Thriving group.  Fixed/Sophisticated students also 
disagreed that they did science work for the sake of learning (mastery goal orientations; 
M=3.53), and were instead, more concerned with avoiding looking incompetent (performance 
avoid goal orientations; M=3.24).   
 The Growth/Passive profile.  At 382 (31.2%), this was the second largest group of the 
sample.  Growth/Passive students reported a belief that their capabilities in science could expand 
with effort (incremental theory of ability; M=4.62) and somewhat disagreed in a fixed view of 
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ability (M=3.25).  Compared to their peers in the other groups, these students reported what 
would be considered the least sophisticated views (highest self-reported score) about the source 
(M=3.58) and certainty (M=3.29) of scientific knowledge.  In other words, Growth/Passive 
students believed more strongly than their peers that only scientific authorities could know the 
one true answer to any scientific question or problem.  Therefore, these students espoused a more 
passive view about scientific knowledge, relative to their peers.  Growth/Passive students were 
fairly mastery oriented in their goal pursuits (M=4.12), but earned below average grades in 
science (M=80.5), which were only higher than their peers in the Uncommitted profile.   
 The Uncommitted profile.  The students of the smallest group in the sample (n=73; 6%) 
were, on average, fairly hesitant in committing to a particular position on their beliefs about 
science ability and the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing.  Compared to their peers, 
Uncommitted students were the least mastery oriented (M=3.02) and the most performance 
avoidant (M=3.40) in their goal orientations.  They were the least confident in their capability to 
do well in science class (self-efficacy; M=3.92).  At the end of the term, these students earned 
the lowest grade of all their peers (M=74.7).   
Group Differences 
 There were differences in the profiles as a function of minority status, grade level, and 
gender.  Table 4 shows the probabilities of students being a member of a latent profile as a 
function of these variables.  Figure 3 graphically illustrates these probabilities for grade level.  
Hispanic and African American students were less likely to be in the Fixed/Sophisticated and 
Thriving groups than were their Asian and White peers.  And Hispanic and African American 
students were more likely to be in the Growth/Passive group than were their Asian and White 
peers.  Girls were more likely to be members of the Fixed/Sophisticated group than were boys.  
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Finally, older students were more likely to be members of the Fixed/Sophisticated group and 
much less likely to be in the Growth/Passive group than were their younger peers.   
Discussion 
 The results of the present investigation illustrate the theoretical and practical significance 
of examining epistemic beliefs and implicit theories of ability along side of one another from a 
holistic analytical framework.  The results refine the theoretical framework that undergirds the 
work in epistemic beliefs.  Hofer and Pintrich (1997) suggested that, in an effort to keep the 
epistemic belief construct conceptually clean, beliefs about the nature of knowledge and 
knowing should be kept separate from beliefs about intellectual ability.  At the same time, 
Schommer-Aikins (2004), in proposing the Embedded Systemic Model, argued that although 
these two beliefs are different constructs they might interact with each other.  This implies that 
implicit theories cannot be excluded from consideration when thinking about epistemic beliefs 
especially in relation to motivation and achievement.  Results of the present investigation suggest 
that, although these two beliefs are separate constructs, implicit theories of ability appear to be 
LPSRUWDQWHQRXJKWRVWXGHQWV¶PRWLYDWLRQDQGDFKLHYHPHQWWKDWWKH\FDQQRWEHLJQRUHGZKHQ
investigating epistemic beliefs. 
 Compare, for example, the Thriving and the Fixed/Sophisticated groups.  Although both 
groups were nearly identical in their sophisticated epistemic beliefs profile, the Thriving group 
reported significantly more adaptive self-efficacy and goal orientations.  Although no causal 
claims can be made, this difference in motivation was related to the significant difference in their 
conceptions of ability.  Also, although both groups of students seemed to perform above average 
in science their patterns of motivation were quite different.  If implicit theories of ability had not 
been considered alongside of epistemic beliefs, the Fixed/Sophisticated group likely would have 
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been grouped together with the Thriving group.  In doing so, researchers would have missed the 
fact that although Fixed/Sophisticated students held sophisticated beliefs about the nature of 
scientific knowledge they believed that their abilities in science were static.  This latter belief 
ZDVUHODWHGWRWKLVJURXS¶VOHVVDGDSWLYHPRWLYDWLRQDOSURILOHAs I discuss later, there are 
important theoretical and practical implications for this. 
 Another noteworthy comparison to make is between the Fixed/Sophisticated profile and 
the Growth/Passive profile.  The interesting features to note here are that the Growth/Passive 
students, compared to their Fixed/Sophisticated peers, reported that they were more likely to 
approach tasks in science for the sake of learning (mastery goal orientation).  This is in line with 
'ZHFNDQG/HJJHWW¶VK\SRWKHVLVWKDWLQFUHPHQWDOYLHZVRIDELOLty are related to mastery 
goal orientations.  However, Fixed/Sophisticated students were significantly more confident in 
their capabilities to perform well in science class (self-efficacy), and at the end of term 
Fixed/Sophisticated students earned significantly higher grades than did their Growth/Passive 
peers.   
Although Dweck and her colleagues report that a Fixed theory is less adaptive than an 
incremental theory, there are some times when a Fixed theory might be related to higher self-
efficacy and achievement (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995).  One possibility is that students who 
have a sophisticated understanding of science and have performed well in the past may believe 
that their high science abilities are an innate and unchanging trait.  Such a belief could very well 
lead to a firm sense of efficacy that they can succeed in science. This result points to the 
possibility that implicit theories, as Dweck and her colleagues have consistently shown, are tied 
specifically to motivation, but that epistemic beliefs may be less strongly related to motivation.  
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As discussed in more depth later, epistemic beliefs might, however, be tied to self-regulated 
learning and metacognition, and ultimately to achievement.   
 It may be, as suggested by Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; 
Molden & Dweck, 2006), that there are other meaning systems besides beliefs about ability.  
Molden and Dweck suggested that these other belief sysWHPVPD\IRUP³RUJDQL]HGV\VWHPV
attract allLHGJRDOVDQGEHJLQWRH[HUWV\VWHPLFLQIOXHQFH´S(SLVWHPLFEHOLHIVPD\EH
one of these meaning systems in which particular allied goals are formed around them, as was 
suggested by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) in their seminal review.  However, whereas implicit 
theories seem to be more tightly connected to motivation, it could be that epistemic beliefs are 
more tightly connected to other aspects of cognition.  Some have suggested that epistemic beliefs 
may be core features of self-regulation (Muis, 2008) and metacognition (Hofer, 2004).  
Therefore, if epistemic beliefs form meaning systems around allied goals, it may be that, for 
students who believe that the best way to know whether something is true in science is simply to 
ask the teacher, these students may organize their goals for learning around such a belief and 
therefore find it irrelevant to do any further investigations into the matter.  This kind of meaning 
system is quite different from students who believe that researching different sides to a scientific 
question and making a decision based on credibility of evidence is the best way to know whether 
something is true.    
 One way in which epistemic beliefs may be conceptualized to operate as a type of 
meaning system is to take the approach hypothesized by Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995).  The 
authors argued that metaphysical systems can be portrayed as being built around either static 
objects or dynamic and evolving processes.  In the static meaning system students emphasize 
³PHDVXUHPHQWRIHQGXULQJSURSHUWLHV´SEXWLQWKHG\QDPLFDQGHYROYLQJPHDQLQJV\VWHP
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³WKHHPSKDVLVLVRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGLQIOXHQFLQJSURFHVVHVLQHYROYLQJV\VWHPV´SThe 
authors also argued that a moderator variable, confidenceKHOSVSUHGLFWVWXGHQWV¶VXEsequent 
EHKDYLRUDQGEHOLHIV:LWKUHJDUGWRVWXGHQWV¶EHOLHIVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH
and knowing, the four dimensions of the construct are quite amenable to this conceptualization.  
For example, students who believe that scientific knowledge is isolated from other fields of 
knowledge, and that there is only one ³correct´ answer to scientific questions may approach 
science in different ways, depending on their self-efficacy to learn science.  Students who believe 
in a single isolated answer in science, but who do not possess the sense of efficacy to learn 
science, may believe that the best source of knowledge resides in the teacher (an external 
authority).  But the student who is self-efficacious about learning science may approach the task 
of finding the correct answer, not by asking the teacher, but by examining arguments from 
several competing sources and then weighing the evidence to make a final decision on the 
correct answer.  Therefore, self-efficacy might well play a moderating role in how epistemic 
beliefs relate to academic outcomes.  Future research could explore this possibility.   
Implications for Practice 
 There are also practical implications for the results of the present study.  This idea of 
incorporating epistemic beliefs with implicit theories to understand science learning and 
motivation is a common theme in many policy documents that call for reforming science 
education.  For example, according to the 1DWLRQDO$FDGHP\RI6FLHQFHV¶ Committee on 
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (2011), one of the crucial aspects of strengthening the 
workforce in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) is to cultivate certain 
Habits of Mind during K-8 science education.  These habits of mind include four strands: (1) 
understanding scientific explanations; (2) generating scientific evidence; (3) reflecting on science 
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knowledge; and (4) participating productively in science.  At the heart of these four strands, is a 
notion of understanding the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing.  For example, the third 
strand, reflecting on science knowledge, LQFOXGHVWKHLGHDWKDW³SURILFLHQWOHDUQHUVXQGHUVWDQG
WKDWVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJHEXLOGVRQLWVHOIDQGFDQEHUHYLVHGRYHUWLPH´S However, 
cultivating a sophisticated view about the nature of scientific knowledge and inquiry is only part 
of the equation.  The Committee noted WKDW³Where is a significant attrition from STEM majors at 
WKHHQGRIWKHIUHVKPDQ\HDULQFROOHJH«DQGWKRVHZKRVZLWFK[majors] tended to blame 
WKHPVHOYHVDQGWKHLUDELOLWLHVZKHQWKH\HQFRXQWHUHGGLIILFXOWLHV´S 
Group Differences in the Profiles 
 The profiles differed as a function of minority status, gender, and grade level.  As 
expected, students in higher grade levels reported more sophisticated epistemic beliefs than did 
their younger peers.  This was clear with the Fixed/Sophisticated versus the Growth/Passive 
students.  Grade 6 students were nearly 2.5 times more likely to be in the Growth/Passive group 
than were their high school peers.  In contrast, high school students were 1.8 times more likely to 
be in the Fixed/Sophisticated group than were their Grade 6 peers.  Because this was a cross-
sectional study, the data do not reveal the reasons for why this may be happening.  However, the 
present study does support past empirical results showing that there is a developmental trend 
such that older students report more sophisticated epistemic beliefs (Pintrich, 2002).  One 
caution regarding this grade level difference should be noted, however.  Because grade level and 
science subject are confounded in the present study, the patterns described may not have arisen 
from differences in age, but rather differences in science subject studied.  Unfortunately, there is 
no realistic way to resolve this. 
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 The present study suggested that there were important differences in the profiles as a 
function of race/ethnicity, contrary to Pintrich¶V (2002) hypothesis about epistemic beliefs, and 
'ZHFN¶VVXJJHVWLRQDERXWLPSOLFLWWKHRULHV.  White and Asian students were over 1.5 
times more likely to be in the Fixed/Sophisticated group than were their Hispanic and African 
American peers.  This suggests that Asian and White students, compared to Hispanic and African 
American students, hold more sophisticated views about the nature of scientific knowledge, 
although they are also more likely to believe in the fixed nature of ability.   
 This partially supports findings from Chen and Pajares (2010), who found that epistemic 
beliefs, but not implicit theories, differed as a function of race/ethnicity.  Because Chen and 
Pajares investigated these relations from a variable-centered perspective, it could be that implicit 
theories of ability alone do not differ as a function of race/ethnicity, but when combined with 
epistemic beliefs in a person-centered approach, differences do arise.  This illustrates why 
person-centered and variable-centered analyses can complement each other.  In the present study, 
performing a t-test to test for mean differences between Hispanic and Black students versus 
Asian and White students revealed some more information.  This analysis revealed that there 
were no differences between boys and girls with respect to incremental or fixed views of ability.  
There were, however, differences as a function of race/ethnicity.  Hispanic and Black students 
reported significantly less sophisticated views about the development, justification, and certainty 
of scientific knowledge than did their Asian and White peers.  Therefore, racial/ethnic 
differences in the profiles likely arose because of differences in epistemic beliefs rather than 
from implicit theories, reinforcing what Chen and Pajares (2010) found.   
 Finally, with regard to gender, the results suggest that gender is an important factor in 
how students view the nature of scientific knowledge and their beliefs about intellectual ability.  
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Girls were more than twice as likely to be in the Fixed/Sophisticated group than were their male 
peers.  This finding supports past empirical evidence showing that girls hold more fixed views 
about ability than do boys (see Dweck, 1999, 2002 for reviews).  A t-test exploring mean 
differences by gender revealed that the gender differences between these two profiles were likely 
due to differences in epistemic beliefs rather than in implicit theories, as there were no gender 
differences in the sample with incremental or fixed views of ability.  This also reinforces 
findings from Chen and Pajares (2010) about gender differences with implicit theories. 
 Two notes should be made before concluding.  First, designating beliefs as either 
sophisticated or naïve is a product of Western thought (Hofer, 2006).  There is still much more 
work that needs to be done to explore the contextually and culturally situated nature of epistemic 
beliefs.  If, as I suggested earlier, researchers conceptualize epistemic beliefs as a meaning 
system whereby beliefs about knowledge and knowing are viewed on a continuum from static 
objects to dynamic and evolving processes, a similar nomenclature may be adopted.  Fixed 
beliefs about the source of knowledge, for example, could mean that students believe that 
scientific knowledge is located in a fixed location²external authorities.  A dynamic view of the 
source of scientific knowledge could mean that students view knowledge as coming from a 
multiplicity of sources, both external to the self and internal, and that this dynamic process of 
FKHFNLQJH[WHUQDOVRXUFHV¶FODLPVZLWKRQH¶VRZQXnderstandings and evidence can help produce 
a deeper understanding of science.  This appears to be a fruitful direction for future research.   
 The second note to be made is that person-centered analyses, despite the nomenclature, 
are still averages of a group of people.  In variable-FHQWHUHGDSSURDFKHVDOOSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VFRUHV
are averaged.  Person-centered analyses help in the sense that there is the assumption that there 
are multiple subcommunities (profiles) of students, each with different measurement errors and 
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clustering properties (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity).  However, groups are still averages of 
many students.  Therefore, even within one group, there may be variability.  The fact that the 
profiles differed on a variety of external variables, though, provides evidence that such 
variability was probably minimal.    
Conclusion 
 Teachers who encourage their students to refine their beliefs about the nature of scientific 
NQRZOHGJHPD\EHIDFLOLWDWLQJWKHLUVWXGHQWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDODVVXPSWLRQV
of science.  %XWDQHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQWJRDOLVWRGHYHORSVWXGHQWV¶Eelief that doing science is well 
within their capacity.  The current push in science education reform to teach students about the 
QDWXUHRIVFLHQFHPD\IDFLOLWDWHVWXGHQWV¶FRPSHWHQFHLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGGRLQJVFLHQFH
However, for adolescents to persist through difficulties in science and ultimately to remain 
within the STEM pipeline, they need to possess the habits of mind mentioned by the Committee 
on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (2011).  Therefore, in addition to teaching students 
about the epistemological assumptions of science, teachers would do well to emphasize the 
incremental nature of ability and the self-regulatory processes like hard work and effective 
strategies that are the hallmark of those who succeed in science-related fields. 
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     Note.  Fixed/Sophisticated: n = 194 (15.8%); Thriving: n = 576 (47.0%); Uncommitted: n = 73 (6.0%); 
     Growth/Passive: n = 382 (31.2%).  
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Figure 1. Four-Class Solution for the Clustering Variables. 
Fixed/Sophisticated 
Thriving 
Uncommitted 
Growth/Passive 
Figure 1
!
         Note.  Means in the same ellipses are not statistically different from each other (at the p<.05) level).  Task=Task goal orientation; 
 Approach=Performance approach goal orientation; Avoid=Performance avoid goal orientation; SSE=Science Self-Efficacy;  
 Grade=Science Grade (out of 100 points).!
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Figure 2. Relation of the Four Latent Classes to Science Motivation and Achievement. 
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Figure 3.  Estimated Probabilities of Being in a Latent Profile as a Function of Grade Level 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations of Variables in the Analysis 
 
Variable M SD Fixed Theory 
Incremental 
Theory 
Epist. 
Beliefs 
(Dvlpmt) 
Epist. 
Beliefs 
(Justif) 
Epist. 
Beliefs 
(Source) 
Epist. 
Beliefs 
(Certain) 
Self 
Efficacy 
Mastery 
Goal 
Perf.  
Approach 
Goal 
Perf. 
Avoid 
Goal 
1. Fixed Theory 2.8 1.2           
2. Incremental Theory 4.6 1.2 - .58 ***          
             
3. Epist. Beliefs (Dvlpmt) 5.2 0.7  - .20 ***   .23 ***         
4. Epist. Beliefs (Justif) 5.2 0.6   - .23 ***   .35 ***   .67 ***        
5. Epist. Beliefs (Source) 2.8 1.0    .15 ***     0  - .25 *** - .08 **       
6. Epist. Beliefs (Certain) 2.4 0.9    .28 ***  - .05 ___ - .43 *** - .28 ***   .64 ***      
             
7. Self-Efficacy 4.9 1.2  - .25 ***    .28 ***   .24 ***   .31 *** - .05 ___ - .17 ***     
             
8. Mastery Goal 4.1 1.1  - .32 ***    .42 ***   .22 ***   .45 ***   .12 ***     0   .38 ***    
9. Perf. Approach Goal 4.3 1.1   - .04     .12 ***   .15 ***   .27 ***   .14 ***   .05   .10 ***   .25 ***   
10. Perf. Avoid Goal 3.0 1.1   .28 ***  - .20 *** - .11 *** - .14 ***   .22 ***   .28 *** - .21 *** - .16 ***   .28 ***  
             
11. Final Grade 83.4 10.5  - .23 ***   .17 ***   .32 ***   .31 *** - .09 ** - .28 ***   .60 ***   .23 ***   .13 ** - .16 *** 
 
Note.             * p < .05.       ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. 
 
Table 1
No.       
Groups Logliklihood
No. Free 
Parameters BIC p LMR Entropy
Smallest Class Freq 
(Rel. Freq)
2 -9127 19 18389 .0000 .756 388 (.317)
3 -8880 26 17944 .1712 .793 77 (.063)
4 -8653 33 17540 .0028 .795 73 (.060)
5 -8547 40 17379 .2145 .810 41 (.033)
6 -8443 47 17221 .1099 .787 20 (.016)
7 -8374 54 17132 .0387 .771 17 (.014)
Note.     BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; p LMR = p values for the Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood 
ratio test for K versus K-1 classes. Smallest Class = size of the smallest latent class and the relative 
proportion.  N = 1225. 
Table 2. Goodness of Fit Indexes
Table 2
Table 3
Variables M SD M SD M SD M SD
Clustering Variables1
     Fixed Theory of Ability 4.02 2.0 2.07 1.7 3.24 1.8 3.25 1.9
     Incremental Theory of Ability 3.30 2.4 5.24 1.3 3.54 2.3 4.62 1.9
     Epistemic Beliefs (Source) 2.43 1.4 2.48 1.6 2.89 1.9 3.58 1.6
     Epistemic Beliefs (Certainty) 2.07 1.1 1.93 1.5 3.05 1.4 3.29 1.7
     Epistemic Beliefs (Development) 5.37 0.8 5.56 0.7 3.68 2.1 4.80 2.3
     Epistemic Beliefs (Justification) 5.19 0.8 5.51 0.6 3.62 2.5 5.01 2.1
Motivation2
     Self-Efficacy 4.52b 1.4 5.21a 1.1 3.92c 1.5 4.68b 1.4
     Mastery Goal 3.53c 1.2 4.46a 1.1 3.02d 1.1 4.12b 1.1
     Performance Approach Goal 4.23a 1.1 4.41a 1.2 3.60b 1.2 4.36a 1.1
     Performance Avoid Goal 3.24a 1.2 2.75b 1.1 3.40a 1.1 3.25a 1.2
Achievement3
     Final Science Grade 83.5b 11.5 86.5a 10.5 74.7d 14.6 80.5c 12.3
Growth/Passive     
n=382 (31.2%)
Note.  Means range from 1 to 6 for clustering and motivation variables, and 1-100 for achievement.  Means 
for motivation and achievement (row) that are subscripted by different letters and in bold are statistically 
different  (! < .05).  Superscripts represent separate analyses.  Sample size of each profile was based on 
students' most likely latent class membership.  N=1225.  
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables Disaggregated by Profile 
Fixed/Sophisticated     
n=194 (15.8%)
Thriving           
n=576 (47.0%)
Uncommitted     
n=73 (6.0%)
Table 3
Table 4
Profile Non-Minority Minority 6 9 10 Female Male
Fixed/Sophisticated 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.32 0.36 0.20 0.11
Thriving 0.43 0.34 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.45
Uncommitted 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06
Growth/Passive 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.17 0.13 0.32 0.38
Gender
Estimated Probabilities of Being in a Profile as a Function of Gender, Minority Status, and Grade Level
Note.  Probability values for minority status were calculated holding grade level constant at 6 and gender at 0 (female).  Probability values for 
grade level were calculated holding minority status at 0 (non-minority) and gender at 0.  Probability values for gender were calculated holding 
minority status at 0 and grade level at 6.  Students self-reporting race/ethnicity as Asian or White were considered non-minority.
Minority Status Grade Level
Table 4
